30 October 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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30 October 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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25X1	France-Algeria: French sectobelieve statements by the prove (PAG) that the Moslem demonstrated ber are intended to be peaceful. That the Secret Army Organization the European settlers, opposing may provoke the Moslems to violates not under the control of the lem crowds and fire on French settlegate general in Algiers told week that if that happens "our for if for any reason the demonstration violence, the OAS might capitality attempt to seize either Oran or an of initial success at least in Oran (Backup, Page).	risional Algerian government rations scheduled for 1 Novem These officials fear, however on (OAS) or extremists among negotiations with the rebels, lence, or that rebel extremible PAG may infiltrate the Mostecurity forces. The French the US consul general last roces will defend themselves." ions result in widespread ze on the ensuing tension to Algiers, with a good chance in.	r,]
	30 Oct 61 DAILY	BRIEF	i 25X1

Soviet 22nd Party Congress

In his address to the congress on 27 October, Khrushchev called for the construction of a monument to thousands of victims of Stalin's terror. He implicated Stalin in the 1934 murder of central party Secretary Sergey Kirov, which Stalin used as an excuse to begin the so-called "great purges" of the mid-1930s, and asserted that Stalin's policies drove heavy industry commissar Sergo Ordzhonikidze to suicide in 1936. According to Western press sources in Moscow, publication of these charges on 28 October was followed by demands for the removal of Stalin's body from the mausoleum.

The American Embassy reports that Moscow intellectuals are asking how Khrushchev can continue his attacks on Stalin while building his own "personality cult." Khrushchev himself asserted that the tribute he has received is in no way officially sponsored.

On 28 October, party Secretary Frol Kozlov--Khrushchev's second in command--delivered his report on the proposed new statutes governing the internal life of the Soviet party which were published for "discussion" last August. His claim that the proposals had been unanimously approved at "all party meetings, conferences, and congresses without exception" indicates that the statutes will be ratified in their original form.

In the wake of Khrushchev's call on Albanian leaders Hoxha and Shehu to resign in order to end the "cult of personality" in their country, Kozlov further warned that a continuation of present "pernicious policies" could lead to Albania's "detachment from the socialist camp" and the isolation of the Albanian party in the world Communist movement. He stated that the only proper method of handling the Soviet-Albanian polemic was through "principled censure" and by seeking out "ways and means of surmounting the differences."

There are rumors in Moscow that presidium candidate member Mikhail Pervukhin and former Premier Bulganin will address

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the congress. They will presumably confess their complicity in the anti-party group, a move which will not prevent their removal from the party central committee but which could spare them the loss of their membership in the party. Former President Voroshilov's latest recantation and acknowledgment of the correctness of the current party line were read to the congress by Khrushchev, who pointed out that "one good turn deserves another." The three unrepentant ringleaders of the group, Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, will almost certainly be expelled from the party, however.

The congress moves into its final phase on 30 October with "debates" on Kozlov's report. Pro-forma ratification of the party statutes will be followed by selection of the new central committee, which in turn will "elect" the party presidium and secretariat. Reports from Moscow continue to indicate that adjournment of the congress is scheduled for the latter part of this week.

NOTE: The first sentence of the second paragraph of the backup article on the 22nd CPSU Congress on Page 1 of the CIB of 28 October 1961 should read: "In addition to the accusation that it failed to support 'de-Stalinization,' the anti-party group is charged with incorrect assessment of the international scene."

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Algerian Demonstrations May Produce Violence

	A French official in the Ministry of Algerian Affairs said
	on 27 October that he expected outbreaks not only in Algeria,
5X1	but also in metropolitan France on 1 November. French Del-
	egate General Morin has pointed out to the US consul general
	that the good intentions of the PAG are not enough to ensure
	that the demonstrations will not result in violence. He said
	that if the Moslem demonstrators displayed rebel flagswhich
	infuriated French Army elements during the December 1960
	riotsFrench forces would have to remove them.
5X1	the PAG plans to carry out assassinations
	under cover of the demonstrations.
	There is some indication that the Moslems may confine
	their demonstrations to predominantly Moslem areas of the

There is some indication that the Moslems may confine their demonstrations to predominantly Moslem areas of the Algerian cities. The bulk of the European population will probably remain as aloof as possible, but Moslem destruction of European property or attacks on Europeans could lead the settlers to violent retaliation.

The PAG is reportedly aware that the Moslem demonstrations in metropolitan France have already harmed the rebel cause in France and that this effect will be compounded if violence breaks out on 1 November. It is apparently willing to accept the risk, however, in view of its major effort, begun soon after its reorganization in August, to "mobilize" the Algerian population. There are also indications that the PAG feels compelled to do something spectacular to redirect attention to the rebel struggle with France because of the great publicity the operations of the OAS have attracted in recent weeks.

The OAS, despite reports of increasing settler disenchantment with its methods, remains a strong threat to the French Government. It resumed clandestine broadcasts in Algeria on 27 October. French officials in Algeria are said to be reluctant to carry out their duties for fear of OAS reprisals. Two French

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